Assignment Prompt & Instructions
CASE STUDY READINGS AND INSTRUCTIONS ATTACHED
– ## CaseStudyInstructions.docx
– ## PublicAdministrationReview-2006-McGuire-IntergovernmentalManagementAViewfromtheBottom.pdf
– StateandLocalGovernmentIntergovernmentalRelationsPartII-1.pdf
– Kincaid-IntroductionSymposiumIntergovernmental-2011.pdf
– Agranoff-DeilWrightsOverlapping-2015.pdf
– Kincaid-BigQuestionsIntergovernmental-2011.pdf
**## CaseStudyInstructions.docx**
**Case Study: The U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Assignment**
**Instructions**
· Provide a biblically based support for your analysis
· Sources must be derived from Read items assigned for the Module: Week in which the Case Study is assigned, peer-reviewed journal articles, and your independent research.
· All citations and format must be in current APA format
· Include 8 – 10 sources, not including your Biblical analysis
· Double-spaced, with 1-inch margins, written in 12-point Times New Roman font.
Paper must be 8-10 pages
**Readings**
[**https://www.jstor.org/stable/41061180?seq=1**](https://www.jstor.org/stable/41061180?seq=1)
[**https://www.jstor.org/stable/24734653?seq=1**](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24734653?seq=1)
[**https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00632.x**](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00632.x)
[**https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41061174.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Aacc01db611b955ee7e905ac55e941391&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1**](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41061174.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Aacc01db611b955ee7e905ac55e941391&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1)
[**file:///D:/VR-DVR/LAW%20AND%20ORDER/State%20and%20Local%20Government%20Intergovernmental%20Relations%20Part%20II.pdf**](file:///D:/VR-DVR/LAW%20AND%20ORDER/State%20and%20Local%20Government%20Intergovernmental%20Relations%20Part%20II.pdf)
**## PublicAdministrationReview-2006-McGuire-IntergovernmentalManagementAViewfromtheBottom.pdf**
Intergovernmental Management 677
Intergovernmental management is more than just inter-
governmental relationships involving the federal govern-
ment. Th ough Professor McGuire agrees that the federal
government has become more intrusive and opportunistic
since the mid-20th century — resulting in less cooperative
intergovernmental relations — he argues that collaborative
management is much more prevalent than it is depicted
in Dr. Conlan’s analysis. A bottom-up view suggests that
local and regional activity can be both opportunistic and
collaborative, and such a perspective must be considered
in any discussion of managing federalism.
T
he 50th anniversary of the Kestnbaum Com-
mission provides an opportunity to refl ect on
the changes in federalism and intergovern-
mental management that have occurred over the past
half century. In his foregoing essay, Tim Conlan thor-
oughly documents the intent of the commission’s
work, the recommendations that emerged from its
report to President Eisenhower, and the subsequent
remaking of American federalism since that time.
Th ere is little doubt that the intergovernmental man-
agement of the 1950s is diff erent from the intergov-
ernmental management of the early 21st century; one
should not expect otherwise. Th ese changes have been
captured through countless metaphors that describe
contemporary federalism, such as the “marble cake”
( Grodzins 1960 ), the “picket fence” ( Sanford 1967 ),
and the “matrix” ( Agranoff 2001 ; Agranoff and
McGuire 2003a). Some have referred to the existence
of “coercive federalism” ( Kincaid 1990 ) and “nation-
centered federalism” ( Beer 1993 ).
Conlan off ers another descriptive term, opportunistic
federalism , which he contrasts with the prevailing
paradigm of the past, cooperative federalism. His
central point in calling current intergovernmental
management opportunistic is that, in some cases, juris-
dictions — namely, the federal government — take ad-
vantage of other jurisdictions, exploiting opportunities
to control or co-opt relationships across governments
rather than pursue shared administrative strategies.
Th e implication is that managing federalism is less
cooperative now than it was when the Kestnbaum
Commission issued its report in June 1955.
Conlan’s empirical analysis is a fi tting contribution to the
research on federalism, off ering evidence of change
rather than a purely philosophical treatise on where
power lies and where it should rest — but not entirely.
Th ough he is optimistic in the end, Conlan remains a
skeptic throughout and is concerned that the state of
intergovernmental management is dominated by federal
government activity, which threatens to “propel opportu-
nistic federalism into the future.” From the top looking
down, it is not diffi cult to come to that conclusion. Th is
predominantly negative view of opportunism from the
top is, however, the primary shortcoming of his analysis.
Not all intergovernmental management involves the
federal government. As Agranoff argues, “[T]he recent
tradition in intergovernmental research must move
away from an obsession with action in Washington
and how much or how little power has accrued where”
(2001, 54). Investigating the extent of cooperation in
intergovernmental relations requires a focus on
national – state – local, interstate ( Zimmerman 1996 ),
and interlocal ( Th urmaier and Wood 2002 ) activities
across multiple functional areas ( Krueger and McGuire
2005 ). Th is would involve “a continuing ‘view from
the states’ and local governments” ( Agranoff 2001, 54 ).
Within the context of studying American federalism,
Martha Derthick writes, “Everywhere one looks, the
answer remains murky and many-sided” (2000, 27).
As a result, attempts to categorize American federal-
ism are largely futile because the scope of activities
across governments and organizations is so ephemeral.
New policies emerge, reforms are undertaken, elec-
tions usher in new approaches to federalism, and
sometimes events dictate entirely new prescriptions
( Stever 2005 ). Like federalism, the character of inter-
governmental management changes over time. Even
the concept itself is ambiguous, as it is of “recent
vintage, specialized usage, limited visibility, and un-
certain maturity” ( Wright and Krane 1998, 1162 ). In
Michael McGuire
Indiana University – Bloomington
Intergovernmental Management: A View from the Bottom
Michael McGuire is an associate
professor of public and environmental
affairs at Indiana University – Bloomington,
where he teaches courses in public
management and intergovernmental
management. He is the coauthor of
Collaborative Public Management: New
Strategies for Local Governments (with
Robert Agranoff, Georgetown University
Press), which received the 2003 Louis
Brownlow Book Award of the National
Academy of Public Administration.
E-mail: mcguirem@indiana.edu .
Rethinking the
Foundations
of Public
Administration:
A Senior–Junior
Exchange
678 Public Administration Review • September | October 2006
some cases, opportunism is an accurate descriptor for
intergovernmental management. In other cases, how-
ever, it is not. And this is the point that unsettles any
meaningful endeavor to label federalism: It depends.
It depends on the policy area, the policy instruments
employed, and even the skills of the administrator.
Th e central question may not be the degree to which
intergovernmental relationships are cooperative but
rather how collaborative they are. Th is distinction is
not a minor one. Collaboration is “a concept that
describes the process of facilitat-
ing and operating in multiorga-
nizational arrangements for
solving problems that cannot be
achieved, or achieved easily, by
single organizations” (Agranoff
and McGuire 2003b, 4). Col-
laboration should not be con-
fused with cooperation.
Although a great deal of collabo-
ration is cooperative — meaning working jointly with
others — collaborative management sometimes entails
the engagement of one or more organizations in a
purposive and offi cial partnership or contractual ar-
rangement, and it sometimes amounts merely to
assisting others in a particular eff ort (4). Collaborative
intergovernmental management is a “routine, regular,
and, in many cases, requisite activity” in jurisdictions
of all sizes (153). Collaboration assumes that govern-
ments are interdependent and that they need each
other to successfully carry out particular policy mak-
ing and administrative functions. It also allows for the
fact that relations may be uneven and that varying
levels of power may exist within the collaboration.
Opportunism and collaboration are not mutually
exclusive, and even in the face of local and state op-
portunism, elements of cooperative federalism still
exist. Indeed, evidence suggests they coexist in many
programs, especially when viewing federalism from
the bottom, which provides the best vantage point for
assessing the extent to which both opportunism and
collaboration are important features of intergovern-
mental management.
Th ere are diff erent models of managing federalism. A
top-down model exists in the area of regulatory pro-
grams, and it “is predicated on the growth of national
programming and tipping the balance within the
federal system toward executive control,” such that the
federal government manages its programs through
state and local governments ( Agranoff and McGuire
2001, 672 ). Th is type of intergovernmental manage-
ment clearly fi ts Conlan’s concern with opportunism
and co-optation. Th e top-down model is collaborative
only to the extent that the federal government (and
state governments) require compliant actors at the
lower levels of government.
A model of intergovernmental management that is
consistent with Conlan’s opportunism and his concern
with state and local governments adapting programs “to
serve strictly parochial ends” is a jurisdiction-based
model (Agranoff and McGuire 2003b). Jurisdiction-
based activity is strategic. It involves local and state
managers interacting with representatives from other
levels of government to design and manage policies that
benefi t the jurisdiction and meet the jurisdiction’s goals.
But such activity is also collaborative. Local and state
managers seek adjustments and policy-making resources
from all directions — vertical and
horizontal — including organiza-
tions from the nongovernmental
sector. Th ese actions are not based
in a sorting out of power across
governments. Jurisdiction-based
management emphasizes “calcula-
tion and negotiation rather than
accommodation and acclimation”
(Agranoff and McGuire 2003b,
49). It is not altogether clear how this type of manage-
ment within federalism leads to parochialism. As Wil-
davsky reminds us, “Uniformity is antithetical to
federalism. Th e existence of states free to disagree with
one another and with the central government inevitably
leads to diff erentiation” (1984, 57).
Bargaining and negotiation over grant programs is a
prevalent component of intergovernmental management
that can be considered both opportunistic and collabora-
tive. Grant programs have always provided the opportu-
nity to bargain, as many have pointed out ( Ingram
1977; Pressman 1975 ), and this continues to be the case
today. To be successful, donors need grant recipients,
and grant recipients need donors; interdependence (thus
collaboration) is the hallmark of many grant programs.
Seeking program adjustments and discretion in grant
and even in regulatory programs (Agranoff and McGuire
2003b) in order to accommodate local, regional, and
state needs is consistent with the ideal of federalism.
Th ere is evidence that the federal government encour-
ages collaborative structures for implementing policies
in multiple policy areas. Hall and O’Toole found that
in the 1960s and the 1990s, the majority of new,
signifi cant federal legislation authorized multiple agen-
cies for implementation (2000), and the trend held for
postlegislation rulemaking as well (2004). Other re-
search has demonstrated that the federal National
Estuary Program encourages implementation networks
that are “more extensive, span more levels of govern-
ment, integrate more experts into policy discussions,
nurture stronger interpersonal ties between stakehold-
ers … thus laying the foundation for a new form of
cooperative governance” ( Schneider et al. 2003, 155 ).
Examples of shared governance that is both opportu-
nistic and collaborative across levels of government are
Local and state managers seek
adjustments and policy-making
resources from all directions —
vertical and horizontal — includ-
ing organizations from the
nongovernmental sector.
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iley O
nline L
ibrary on [20/07/2025]. See the T
erm
s and C
onditions (https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com
/term
s-and-conditions) on W
iley O
nline L
ibrary for rules of use; O
A
articles are governed by the applicable C
reative C
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ons L
icense
Intergovernmental Management 679
numerous (Agranoff 2003; Moynihan 2005 ). For
instance, consider the way that local opportunism is
blended with collaboration in the Shared Strategy for
Puget Sound, an initiative to restore and protect
salmon runs across Puget Sound. Under the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries and
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service are the federal
agencies responsible for implementation. Th e act
requires a recovery plan for listed species that typically
is written by the federal agencies prescribing local
actions. Realizing the opportunity to act on behalf
of the region — not just the wishes of the federal
government exclusively — a collaborative initiative was
undertaken to coordinate with existing recovery eff orts
in the area. Parties to the eff ort include tribal govern-
ments, state government, local governments, business
and conservation groups, and, perhaps most impor-
tant for this collaborative eff ort, NOAA Fisheries and
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Th e Shared Strategy is
the fi rst regional eff ort to develop a recovery plan not
written by federal agencies. From the bottom up, this
example of intergovernmental management appears to
be both opportunistic and collaborative.
Th ere can be no argument that national actions have
become more dominant since the time of the
Kestnbaum Commission, particularly in recent years.
As Conlan states, legislation such as the No Child Left
Behind Act is “intrusive and dismissive of state and
local concerns,” but it is important that any discussion
of managing within federalism include a view from
the bottom. As collaborative intergovernmental and
interorganizational networks develop in many policy
areas, the opportunities for assertive local and regional
action are both prominent and encouraging.
References
Agranoff , Robert . 2001 . Managing Within the
Matrix: Do Collaborative Intergovernmental
Relations Exist? Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism
31 ( 2 ): 31 – 56 .
— — — . 2003 . Leveraging Networks: A Guide for
Public Managers Working across Organizations .
Washington, DC : IBM Center for the Business of
Government .
Agranoff , Robert , and Michael McGuire . 2001 . American
Federalism and the Search for Models of Management .
Public Administration Review 61 ( 6 ): 671 – 81 .
— — — . 2003a . Inside the Matrix: Integrating the
Paradigms of Intergovernmental and Network
Management . International Journal of Public
Administration 26 ( 12 ): 1401 – 22 .
— — — . 2003b . Collaborative Public Management:
New Strategies for Local Governments . Washington,
DC : Georgetown University Press .
Beer , Samuel H . 1993 . To Make a Nation: Th e
Rediscovery of American Federalism . Cambridge,
MA : Belknap Press .
Derthick , Martha . 2000 . American Federalism: Half-
Full or Half-Empty? Brookings Review 18 ( 1 ): 24 – 27 .
Grodzins , Morton . 1960 . Th e Federal System . In
Goals for Americans: Th e Report of the President’s
Commission on National Goals , 265 – 82 . Englewood
Cliff s, NJ : Prentice Hall .
Hall , Th ad E ., and Laurence J O’Toole , Jr . 2000 .
Structures for Policy Implementation: An Analysis
of National Legislation, 1965 – 66 and 1993 – 94 .
Administration & Society 31 ( 6 ): 667 – 86 .
— — — . 2004 . Shaping Formal Networks through the
Regulatory Process . Administration & Society 36 ( 2 ):
186 – 207 .
Ingram , Helen . 1977 . Policy Implementation through
Bargaining: Th e Case of Federal Grants-in-Aid .
Public Policy 25 ( 4 ): 499 – 526 .
Kincaid , John . 1990 . From Cooperative to Coercive
Federalism . Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 509 : 139 – 52 .
Krueger , Skip , and Michael McGuire . 2005 . A
Transaction Costs Explanation of Interlocal
Government Collaboration . Paper presented at the
Eighth National Public Management Research
Conference , September 29 – October 1 , Los Angeles .
Moynihan , Donald P . 2005 . Leveraging Collaborative
Networks in Infrequent Emergency Situations .
Washington, DC : IBM Center for the Business of
Government .
Pressman , Jeff rey L . 1975 . Federal Programs and City
Politics: Th e Dynamics of the Aid Process in Oakland .
Berkeley : University of California Press .
Sanford , Terry . 1967 . Storm over the States . New York :
McGraw-Hill .
Schneider , Mark , John Scholz , Mark Lubell , Denisa
Mindruta , and Matthew Edwardsen . 2003 .
Building Consensual Institutions: Networks and
the National Estuary Program . American Journal of
Political Science 47 ( 1 ): 143 – 58 .
Stever , James A . 2005 . Adapting Intergovernmental
Management to the New Age of Terrorism .
Administration & Society 37 ( 4 ): 379 – 403 .
Th urmaier , Kurt , and Curtis Wood . 2002 . Interlocal
Agreements as Overlapping Social Networks:
Picket-Fence Regionalism in Metropolitan Kansas
City . Public Administration Review 62 ( 5 ): 585 – 98 .
Wildavsky , Aaron . 1984 . Federalism Means
Inequality: Political Geometry, Political Sociology,
and Political Culture . In Th e Costs of Federalism ,
edited by Robert T . Golembiewski and Aaron
Wildavsky , 55 – 59 . New Brunswick, NJ :
Transaction Books .
Wright , Deil S ., and Dale Krane . 1998 .
Intergovernmental Management (IGM) . In
International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and
Administration , edited by Jay M . Shafritz . Boulder,
CO : Westview .
Zimmerman , Joseph F . 1996 . Interstate Relations: Th e
Neglected Dimension of Federalism . Westport, CT :
Praeger .
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/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00632.x by L
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niversity O
nline, W
iley O
nline L
ibrary on [20/07/2025]. See the T
erm
s and C
onditions (https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com
/term
s-and-conditions) on W
iley O
nline L
ibrary for rules of use; O
A
articles are governed by the applicable C
reative C
om
m
ons L
icense
**StateandLocalGovernmentIntergovernmentalRelationsPartII-1.pdf**
This file is too large to display. [View in new window](https://www.sweetstudy.com/files/stateandlocalgovernmentintergovernmentalrelationspartii-1-pdf)
**Kincaid-IntroductionSymposiumIntergovernmental-2011.pdf**
This file is too large to display. [View in new window](https://www.sweetstudy.com/files/kincaid-introductionsymposiumintergovernmental-2011-pdf)
**Agranoff-DeilWrightsOverlapping-2015.pdf**
This file is too large to display. [View in new window](https://www.sweetstudy.com/files/agranoff-deilwrightsoverlapping-2015-pdf)
**Kincaid-BigQuestionsIntergovernmental-2011.pdf**
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**Kincaid-BigQuestionsIntergovernmental-2011.pdf**
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**## CaseStudyInstructions.docx**
**Case Study: The U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Assignment**
**Instructions**
· Provide a biblically based support for your analysis
· Sources must be derived from Read items assigned for the Module: Week in which the Case Study is assigned, peer-reviewed journal articles, and your independent research.
· All citations and format must be in current APA format
· Include 8 – 10 sources, not including your Biblical analysis
· Double-spaced, with 1-inch margins, written in 12-point Times New Roman font.
Paper must be 8-10 pages
**Readings**
[**https://www.jstor.org/stable/41061180?seq=1**](https://www.jstor.org/stable/41061180?seq=1)
[**https://www.jstor.org/stable/24734653?seq=1**](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24734653?seq=1)
[**https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00632.x**](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00632.x)
[**https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41061174.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Aacc01db611b955ee7e905ac55e941391&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1**](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41061174.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Aacc01db611b955ee7e905ac55e941391&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1)
[**file:///D:/VR-DVR/LAW%20AND%20ORDER/State%20and%20Local%20Government%20Intergovernmental%20Relations%20Part%20II.pdf**](file:///D:/VR-DVR/LAW%20AND%20ORDER/State%20and%20Local%20Government%20Intergovernmental%20Relations%20Part%20II.pdf)
**## PublicAdministrationReview-2006-McGuire-IntergovernmentalManagementAViewfromtheBottom.pdf**
Intergovernmental Management 677
Intergovernmental management is more than just inter-
governmental relationships involving the federal govern-
ment. Th ough Professor McGuire agrees that the federal
government has become more intrusive and opportunistic
since the mid-20th century — resulting in less cooperative
intergovernmental relations — he argues that collaborative
management is much more prevalent than it is depicted
in Dr. Conlan’s analysis. A bottom-up view suggests that
local and regional activity can be both opportunistic and
collaborative, and such a perspective must be considered
in any discussion of managing federalism.
T
he 50th anniversary of the Kestnbaum Com-
mission provides an opportunity to refl ect on
the changes in federalism and intergovern-
mental management that have occurred over the past
half century. In his foregoing essay, Tim Conlan thor-
oughly documents the intent of the commission’s
work, the recommendations that emerged from its
report to President Eisenhower, and the subsequent
remaking of American federalism since that time.
Th ere is little doubt that the intergovernmental man-
agement of the 1950s is diff erent from the intergov-
ernmental management of the early 21st century; one
should not expect otherwise. Th ese changes have been
captured through countless metaphors that describe
contemporary federalism, such as the “marble cake”
( Grodzins 1960 ), the “picket fence” ( Sanford 1967 ),
and the “matrix” ( Agranoff 2001 ; Agranoff and
McGuire 2003a). Some have referred to the existence
of “coercive federalism” ( Kincaid 1990 ) and “nation-
centered federalism” ( Beer 1993 ).
Conlan off ers another descriptive term, opportunistic
federalism , which he contrasts with the prevailing
paradigm of the past, cooperative federalism. His
central point in calling current intergovernmental
management opportunistic is that, in some cases, juris-
dictions — namely, the federal government — take ad-
vantage of other jurisdictions, exploiting opportunities
to control or co-opt relationships across governments
rather than pursue shared administrative strategies.
Th e implication is that managing federalism is less
cooperative now than it was when the Kestnbaum
Commission issued its report in June 1955.
Conlan’s empirical analysis is a fi tting contribution to the
research on federalism, off ering evidence of change
rather than a purely philosophical treatise on where
power lies and where it should rest — but not entirely.
Th ough he is optimistic in the end, Conlan remains a
skeptic throughout and is concerned that the state of
intergovernmental management is dominated by federal
government activity, which threatens to “propel opportu-
nistic federalism into the future.” From the top looking
down, it is not diffi cult to come to that conclusion. Th is
predominantly negative view of opportunism from the
top is, however, the primary shortcoming of his analysis.
Not all intergovernmental management involves the
federal government. As Agranoff argues, “[T]he recent
tradition in intergovernmental research must move
away from an obsession with action in Washington
and how much or how little power has accrued where”
(2001, 54). Investigating the extent of cooperation in
intergovernmental relations requires a focus on
national – state – local, interstate ( Zimmerman 1996 ),
and interlocal ( Th urmaier and Wood 2002 ) activities
across multiple functional areas ( Krueger and McGuire
2005 ). Th is would involve “a continuing ‘view from
the states’ and local governments” ( Agranoff 2001, 54 ).
Within the context of studying American federalism,
Martha Derthick writes, “Everywhere one looks, the
answer remains murky and many-sided” (2000, 27).
As a result, attempts to categorize American federal-
ism are largely futile because the scope of activities
across governments and organizations is so ephemeral.
New policies emerge, reforms are undertaken, elec-
tions usher in new approaches to federalism, and
sometimes events dictate entirely new prescriptions
( Stever 2005 ). Like federalism, the character of inter-
governmental management changes over time. Even
the concept itself is ambiguous, as it is of “recent
vintage, specialized usage, limited visibility, and un-
certain maturity” ( Wright and Krane 1998, 1162 ). In
Michael McGuire
Indiana University – Bloomington
Intergovernmental Management: A View from the Bottom
Michael McGuire is an associate
professor of public and environmental
affairs at Indiana University – Bloomington,
where he teaches courses in public
management and intergovernmental
management. He is the coauthor of
Collaborative Public Management: New
Strategies for Local Governments (with
Robert Agranoff, Georgetown University
Press), which received the 2003 Louis
Brownlow Book Award of the National
Academy of Public Administration.
E-mail: mcguirem@indiana.edu .
Rethinking the
Foundations
of Public
Administration:
A Senior–Junior
Exchange
678 Public Administration Review • September | October 2006
some cases, opportunism is an accurate descriptor for
intergovernmental management. In other cases, how-
ever, it is not. And this is the point that unsettles any
meaningful endeavor to label federalism: It depends.
It depends on the policy area, the policy instruments
employed, and even the skills of the administrator.
Th e central question may not be the degree to which
intergovernmental relationships are cooperative but
rather how collaborative they are. Th is distinction is
not a minor one. Collaboration is “a concept that
describes the process of facilitat-
ing and operating in multiorga-
nizational arrangements for
solving problems that cannot be
achieved, or achieved easily, by
single organizations” (Agranoff
and McGuire 2003b, 4). Col-
laboration should not be con-
fused with cooperation.
Although a great deal of collabo-
ration is cooperative — meaning working jointly with
others — collaborative management sometimes entails
the engagement of one or more organizations in a
purposive and offi cial partnership or contractual ar-
rangement, and it sometimes amounts merely to
assisting others in a particular eff ort (4). Collaborative
intergovernmental management is a “routine, regular,
and, in many cases, requisite activity” in jurisdictions
of all sizes (153). Collaboration assumes that govern-
ments are interdependent and that they need each
other to successfully carry out particular policy mak-
ing and administrative functions. It also allows for the
fact that relations may be uneven and that varying
levels of power may exist within the collaboration.
Opportunism and collaboration are not mutually
exclusive, and even in the face of local and state op-
portunism, elements of cooperative federalism still
exist. Indeed, evidence suggests they coexist in many
programs, especially when viewing federalism from
the bottom, which provides the best vantage point for
assessing the extent to which both opportunism and
collaboration are important features of intergovern-
mental management.
Th ere are diff erent models of managing federalism. A
top-down model exists in the area of regulatory pro-
grams, and it “is predicated on the growth of national
programming and tipping the balance within the
federal system toward executive control,” such that the
federal government manages its programs through
state and local governments ( Agranoff and McGuire
2001, 672 ). Th is type of intergovernmental manage-
ment clearly fi ts Conlan’s concern with opportunism
and co-optation. Th e top-down model is collaborative
only to the extent that the federal government (and
state governments) require compliant actors at the
lower levels of government.
A model of intergovernmental management that is
consistent with Conlan’s opportunism and his concern
with state and local governments adapting programs “to
serve strictly parochial ends” is a jurisdiction-based
model (Agranoff and McGuire 2003b). Jurisdiction-
based activity is strategic. It involves local and state
managers interacting with representatives from other
levels of government to design and manage policies that
benefi t the jurisdiction and meet the jurisdiction’s goals.
But such activity is also collaborative. Local and state
managers seek adjustments and policy-making resources
from all directions — vertical and
horizontal — including organiza-
tions from the nongovernmental
sector. Th ese actions are not based
in a sorting out of power across
governments. Jurisdiction-based
management emphasizes “calcula-
tion and negotiation rather than
accommodation and acclimation”
(Agranoff and McGuire 2003b,
49). It is not altogether clear how this type of manage-
ment within federalism leads to parochialism. As Wil-
davsky reminds us, “Uniformity is antithetical to
federalism. Th e existence of states free to disagree with
one another and with the central government inevitably
leads to diff erentiation” (1984, 57).
Bargaining and negotiation over grant programs is a
prevalent component of intergovernmental management
that can be considered both opportunistic and collabora-
tive. Grant programs have always provided the opportu-
nity to bargain, as many have pointed out ( Ingram
1977; Pressman 1975 ), and this continues to be the case
today. To be successful, donors need grant recipients,
and grant recipients need donors; interdependence (thus
collaboration) is the hallmark of many grant programs.
Seeking program adjustments and discretion in grant
and even in regulatory programs (Agranoff and McGuire
2003b) in order to accommodate local, regional, and
state needs is consistent with the ideal of federalism.
Th ere is evidence that the federal government encour-
ages collaborative structures for implementing policies
in multiple policy areas. Hall and O’Toole found that
in the 1960s and the 1990s, the majority of new,
signifi cant federal legislation authorized multiple agen-
cies for implementation (2000), and the trend held for
postlegislation rulemaking as well (2004). Other re-
search has demonstrated that the federal National
Estuary Program encourages implementation networks
that are “more extensive, span more levels of govern-
ment, integrate more experts into policy discussions,
nurture stronger interpersonal ties between stakehold-
ers … thus laying the foundation for a new form of
cooperative governance” ( Schneider et al. 2003, 155 ).
Examples of shared governance that is both opportu-
nistic and collaborative across levels of government are
Local and state managers seek
adjustments and policy-making
resources from all directions —
vertical and horizontal — includ-
ing organizations from the
nongovernmental sector.
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iberty U
niversity O
nline, W
iley O
nline L
ibrary on [20/07/2025]. See the T
erm
s and C
onditions (https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com
/term
s-and-conditions) on W
iley O
nline L
ibrary for rules of use; O
A
articles are governed by the applicable C
reative C
om
m
ons L
icense
Intergovernmental Management 679
numerous (Agranoff 2003; Moynihan 2005 ). For
instance, consider the way that local opportunism is
blended with collaboration in the Shared Strategy for
Puget Sound, an initiative to restore and protect
salmon runs across Puget Sound. Under the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries and
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service are the federal
agencies responsible for implementation. Th e act
requires a recovery plan for listed species that typically
is written by the federal agencies prescribing local
actions. Realizing the opportunity to act on behalf
of the region — not just the wishes of the federal
government exclusively — a collaborative initiative was
undertaken to coordinate with existing recovery eff orts
in the area. Parties to the eff ort include tribal govern-
ments, state government, local governments, business
and conservation groups, and, perhaps most impor-
tant for this collaborative eff ort, NOAA Fisheries and
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Th e Shared Strategy is
the fi rst regional eff ort to develop a recovery plan not
written by federal agencies. From the bottom up, this
example of intergovernmental management appears to
be both opportunistic and collaborative.
Th ere can be no argument that national actions have
become more dominant since the time of the
Kestnbaum Commission, particularly in recent years.
As Conlan states, legislation such as the No Child Left
Behind Act is “intrusive and dismissive of state and
local concerns,” but it is important that any discussion
of managing within federalism include a view from
the bottom. As collaborative intergovernmental and
interorganizational networks develop in many policy
areas, the opportunities for assertive local and regional
action are both prominent and encouraging.
References
Agranoff , Robert . 2001 . Managing Within the
Matrix: Do Collaborative Intergovernmental
Relations Exist? Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism
31 ( 2 ): 31 – 56 .
— — — . 2003 . Leveraging Networks: A Guide for
Public Managers Working across Organizations .
Washington, DC : IBM Center for the Business of
Government .
Agranoff , Robert , and Michael McGuire . 2001 . American
Federalism and the Search for Models of Management .
Public Administration Review 61 ( 6 ): 671 – 81 .
— — — . 2003a . Inside the Matrix: Integrating the
Paradigms of Intergovernmental and Network
Management . International Journal of Public
Administration 26 ( 12 ): 1401 – 22 .
— — — . 2003b . Collaborative Public Management:
New Strategies for Local Governments . Washington,
DC : Georgetown University Press .
Beer , Samuel H . 1993 . To Make a Nation: Th e
Rediscovery of American Federalism . Cambridge,
MA : Belknap Press .
Derthick , Martha . 2000 . American Federalism: Half-
Full or Half-Empty? Brookings Review 18 ( 1 ): 24 – 27 .
Grodzins , Morton . 1960 . Th e Federal System . In
Goals for Americans: Th e Report of the President’s
Commission on National Goals , 265 – 82 . Englewood
Cliff s, NJ : Prentice Hall .
Hall , Th ad E ., and Laurence J O’Toole , Jr . 2000 .
Structures for Policy Implementation: An Analysis
of National Legislation, 1965 – 66 and 1993 – 94 .
Administration & Society 31 ( 6 ): 667 – 86 .
— — — . 2004 . Shaping Formal Networks through the
Regulatory Process . Administration & Society 36 ( 2 ):
186 – 207 .
Ingram , Helen . 1977 . Policy Implementation through
Bargaining: Th e Case of Federal Grants-in-Aid .
Public Policy 25 ( 4 ): 499 – 526 .
Kincaid , John . 1990 . From Cooperative to Coercive
Federalism . Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 509 : 139 – 52 .
Krueger , Skip , and Michael McGuire . 2005 . A
Transaction Costs Explanation of Interlocal
Government Collaboration . Paper presented at the
Eighth National Public Management Research
Conference , September 29 – October 1 , Los Angeles .
Moynihan , Donald P . 2005 . Leveraging Collaborative
Networks in Infrequent Emergency Situations .
Washington, DC : IBM Center for the Business of
Government .
Pressman , Jeff rey L . 1975 . Federal Programs and City
Politics: Th e Dynamics of the Aid Process in Oakland .
Berkeley : University of California Press .
Sanford , Terry . 1967 . Storm over the States . New York :
McGraw-Hill .
Schneider , Mark , John Scholz , Mark Lubell , Denisa
Mindruta , and Matthew Edwardsen . 2003 .
Building Consensual Institutions: Networks and
the National Estuary Program . American Journal of
Political Science 47 ( 1 ): 143 – 58 .
Stever , James A . 2005 . Adapting Intergovernmental
Management to the New Age of Terrorism .
Administration & Society 37 ( 4 ): 379 – 403 .
Th urmaier , Kurt , and Curtis Wood . 2002 . Interlocal
Agreements as Overlapping Social Networks:
Picket-Fence Regionalism in Metropolitan Kansas
City . Public Administration Review 62 ( 5 ): 585 – 98 .
Wildavsky , Aaron . 1984 . Federalism Means
Inequality: Political Geometry, Political Sociology,
and Political Culture . In Th e Costs of Federalism ,
edited by Robert T . Golembiewski and Aaron
Wildavsky , 55 – 59 . New Brunswick, NJ :
Transaction Books .
Wright , Deil S ., and Dale Krane . 1998 .
Intergovernmental Management (IGM) . In
International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and
Administration , edited by Jay M . Shafritz . Boulder,
CO : Westview .
Zimmerman , Joseph F . 1996 . Interstate Relations: Th e
Neglected Dimension of Federalism . Westport, CT :
Praeger .
15406210, 2006, 5, D
ow
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https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com
/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00632.x by L
iberty U
niversity O
nline, W
iley O
nline L
ibrary on [20/07/2025]. See the T
erm
s and C
onditions (https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com
/term
s-and-conditions) on W
iley O
nline L
ibrary for rules of use; O
A
articles are governed by the applicable C
reative C
om
m
ons L
icense
**StateandLocalGovernmentIntergovernmentalRelationsPartII-1.pdf**
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**Kincaid-IntroductionSymposiumIntergovernmental-2011.pdf**
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**Agranoff-DeilWrightsOverlapping-2015.pdf**
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**Kincaid-BigQuestionsIntergovernmental-2011.pdf**
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**## CaseStudyInstructions.docx**
**Case Study: The U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Assignment**
**Instructions**
· Provide a biblically based support for your analysis
· Sources must be derived from Read items assigned for the Module: Week in which the Case Study is assigned, peer-reviewed journal articles, and your independent research.
· All citations and format must be in current APA format
· Include 8 – 10 sources, not including your Biblical analysis
· Double-spaced, with 1-inch margins, written in 12-point Times New Roman font.
Paper must be 8-10 pages
**Readings**
[**https://www.jstor.org/stable/41061180?seq=1**](https://www.jstor.org/stable/41061180?seq=1)
[**https://www.jstor.org/stable/24734653?seq=1**](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24734653?seq=1)
[**https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00632.x**](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00632.x)
[**https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41061174.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Aacc01db611b955ee7e905ac55e941391&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1**](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41061174.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Aacc01db611b955ee7e905ac55e941391&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1)
[**file:///D:/VR-DVR/LAW%20AND%20ORDER/State%20and%20Local%20Government%20Intergovernmental%20Relations%20Part%20II.pdf**](file:///D:/VR-DVR/LAW%20AND%20ORDER/State%20and%20Local%20Government%20Intergovernmental%20Relations%20Part%20II.pdf)
**## PublicAdministrationReview-2006-McGuire-IntergovernmentalManagementAViewfromtheBottom.pdf**
Intergovernmental Management 677
Intergovernmental management is more than just inter-
governmental relationships involving the federal govern-
ment. Th ough Professor McGuire agrees that the federal
government has become more intrusive and opportunistic
since the mid-20th century — resulting in less cooperative
intergovernmental relations — he argues that collaborative
management is much more prevalent than it is depicted
in Dr. Conlan’s analysis. A bottom-up view suggests that
local and regional activity can be both opportunistic and
collaborative, and such a perspective must be considered
in any discussion of managing federalism.
T
he 50th anniversary of the Kestnbaum Com-
mission provides an opportunity to refl ect on
the changes in federalism and intergovern-
mental management that have occurred over the past
half century. In his foregoing essay, Tim Conlan thor-
oughly documents the intent of the commission’s
work, the recommendations that emerged from its
report to President Eisenhower, and the subsequent
remaking of American federalism since that time.
Th ere is little doubt that the intergovernmental man-
agement of the 1950s is diff erent from the intergov-
ernmental management of the early 21st century; one
should not expect otherwise. Th ese changes have been
captured through countless metaphors that describe
contemporary federalism, such as the “marble cake”
( Grodzins 1960 ), the “picket fence” ( Sanford 1967 ),
and the “matrix” ( Agranoff 2001 ; Agranoff and
McGuire 2003a). Some have referred to the existence
of “coercive federalism” ( Kincaid 1990 ) and “nation-
centered federalism” ( Beer 1993 ).
Conlan off ers another descriptive term, opportunistic
federalism , which he contrasts with the prevailing
paradigm of the past, cooperative federalism. His
central point in calling current intergovernmental
management opportunistic is that, in some cases, juris-
dictions — namely, the federal government — take ad-
vantage of other jurisdictions, exploiting opportunities
to control or co-opt relationships across governments
rather than pursue shared administrative strategies.
Th e implication is that managing federalism is less
cooperative now than it was when the Kestnbaum
Commission issued its report in June 1955.
Conlan’s empirical analysis is a fi tting contribution to the
research on federalism, off ering evidence of change
rather than a purely philosophical treatise on where
power lies and where it should rest — but not entirely.
Th ough he is optimistic in the end, Conlan remains a
skeptic throughout and is concerned that the state of
intergovernmental management is dominated by federal
government activity, which threatens to “propel opportu-
nistic federalism into the future.” From the top looking
down, it is not diffi cult to come to that conclusion. Th is
predominantly negative view of opportunism from the
top is, however, the primary shortcoming of his analysis.
Not all intergovernmental management involves the
federal government. As Agranoff argues, “[T]he recent
tradition in intergovernmental research must move
away from an obsession with action in Washington
and how much or how little power has accrued where”
(2001, 54). Investigating the extent of cooperation in
intergovernmental relations requires a focus on
national – state – local, interstate ( Zimmerman 1996 ),
and interlocal ( Th urmaier and Wood 2002 ) activities
across multiple functional areas ( Krueger and McGuire
2005 ). Th is would involve “a continuing ‘view from
the states’ and local governments” ( Agranoff 2001, 54 ).
Within the context of studying American federalism,
Martha Derthick writes, “Everywhere one looks, the
answer remains murky and many-sided” (2000, 27).
As a result, attempts to categorize American federal-
ism are largely futile because the scope of activities
across governments and organizations is so ephemeral.
New policies emerge, reforms are undertaken, elec-
tions usher in new approaches to federalism, and
sometimes events dictate entirely new prescriptions
( Stever 2005 ). Like federalism, the character of inter-
governmental management changes over time. Even
the concept itself is ambiguous, as it is of “recent
vintage, specialized usage, limited visibility, and un-
certain maturity” ( Wright and Krane 1998, 1162 ). In
Michael McGuire
Indiana University – Bloomington
Intergovernmental Management: A View from the Bottom
Michael McGuire is an associate
professor of public and environmental
affairs at Indiana University – Bloomington,
where he teaches courses in public
management and intergovernmental
management. He is the coauthor of
Collaborative Public Management: New
Strategies for Local Governments (with
Robert Agranoff, Georgetown University
Press), which received the 2003 Louis
Brownlow Book Award of the National
Academy of Public Administration.
E-mail: mcguirem@indiana.edu .
Rethinking the
Foundations
of Public
Administration:
A Senior–Junior
Exchange
678 Public Administration Review • September | October 2006
some cases, opportunism is an accurate descriptor for
intergovernmental management. In other cases, how-
ever, it is not. And this is the point that unsettles any
meaningful endeavor to label federalism: It depends.
It depends on the policy area, the policy instruments
employed, and even the skills of the administrator.
Th e central question may not be the degree to which
intergovernmental relationships are cooperative but
rather how collaborative they are. Th is distinction is
not a minor one. Collaboration is “a concept that
describes the process of facilitat-
ing and operating in multiorga-
nizational arrangements for
solving problems that cannot be
achieved, or achieved easily, by
single organizations” (Agranoff
and McGuire 2003b, 4). Col-
laboration should not be con-
fused with cooperation.
Although a great deal of collabo-
ration is cooperative — meaning working jointly with
others — collaborative management sometimes entails
the engagement of one or more organizations in a
purposive and offi cial partnership or contractual ar-
rangement, and it sometimes amounts merely to
assisting others in a particular eff ort (4). Collaborative
intergovernmental management is a “routine, regular,
and, in many cases, requisite activity” in jurisdictions
of all sizes (153). Collaboration assumes that govern-
ments are interdependent and that they need each
other to successfully carry out particular policy mak-
ing and administrative functions. It also allows for the
fact that relations may be uneven and that varying
levels of power may exist within the collaboration.
Opportunism and collaboration are not mutually
exclusive, and even in the face of local and state op-
portunism, elements of cooperative federalism still
exist. Indeed, evidence suggests they coexist in many
programs, especially when viewing federalism from
the bottom, which provides the best vantage point for
assessing the extent to which both opportunism and
collaboration are important features of intergovern-
mental management.
Th ere are diff erent models of managing federalism. A
top-down model exists in the area of regulatory pro-
grams, and it “is predicated on the growth of national
programming and tipping the balance within the
federal system toward executive control,” such that the
federal government manages its programs through
state and local governments ( Agranoff and McGuire
2001, 672 ). Th is type of intergovernmental manage-
ment clearly fi ts Conlan’s concern with opportunism
and co-optation. Th e top-down model is collaborative
only to the extent that the federal government (and
state governments) require compliant actors at the
lower levels of government.
A model of intergovernmental management that is
consistent with Conlan’s opportunism and his concern
with state and local governments adapting programs “to
serve strictly parochial ends” is a jurisdiction-based
model (Agranoff and McGuire 2003b). Jurisdiction-
based activity is strategic. It involves local and state
managers interacting with representatives from other
levels of government to design and manage policies that
benefi t the jurisdiction and meet the jurisdiction’s goals.
But such activity is also collaborative. Local and state
managers seek adjustments and policy-making resources
from all directions — vertical and
horizontal — including organiza-
tions from the nongovernmental
sector. Th ese actions are not based
in a sorting out of power across
governments. Jurisdiction-based
management emphasizes “calcula-
tion and negotiation rather than
accommodation and acclimation”
(Agranoff and McGuire 2003b,
49). It is not altogether clear how this type of manage-
ment within federalism leads to parochialism. As Wil-
davsky reminds us, “Uniformity is antithetical to
federalism. Th e existence of states free to disagree with
one another and with the central government inevitably
leads to diff erentiation” (1984, 57).
Bargaining and negotiation over grant programs is a
prevalent component of intergovernmental management
that can be considered both opportunistic and collabora-
tive. Grant programs have always provided the opportu-
nity to bargain, as many have pointed out ( Ingram
1977; Pressman 1975 ), and this continues to be the case
today. To be successful, donors need grant recipients,
and grant recipients need donors; interdependence (thus
collaboration) is the hallmark of many grant programs.
Seeking program adjustments and discretion in grant
and even in regulatory programs (Agranoff and McGuire
2003b) in order to accommodate local, regional, and
state needs is consistent with the ideal of federalism.
Th ere is evidence that the federal government encour-
ages collaborative structures for implementing policies
in multiple policy areas. Hall and O’Toole found that
in the 1960s and the 1990s, the majority of new,
signifi cant federal legislation authorized multiple agen-
cies for implementation (2000), and the trend held for
postlegislation rulemaking as well (2004). Other re-
search has demonstrated that the federal National
Estuary Program encourages implementation networks
that are “more extensive, span more levels of govern-
ment, integrate more experts into policy discussions,
nurture stronger interpersonal ties between stakehold-
ers … thus laying the foundation for a new form of
cooperative governance” ( Schneider et al. 2003, 155 ).
Examples of shared governance that is both opportu-
nistic and collaborative across levels of government are
Local and state managers seek
adjustments and policy-making
resources from all directions —
vertical and horizontal — includ-
ing organizations from the
nongovernmental sector.
15406210, 2006, 5, D
ow
nloaded from
https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com
/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00632.x by L
iberty U
niversity O
nline, W
iley O
nline L
ibrary on [20/07/2025]. See the T
erm
s and C
onditions (https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com
/term
s-and-conditions) on W
iley O
nline L
ibrary for rules of use; O
A
articles are governed by the applicable C
reative C
om
m
ons L
icense
Intergovernmental Management 679
numerous (Agranoff 2003; Moynihan 2005 ). For
instance, consider the way that local opportunism is
blended with collaboration in the Shared Strategy for
Puget Sound, an initiative to restore and protect
salmon runs across Puget Sound. Under the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries and
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service are the federal
agencies responsible for implementation. Th e act
requires a recovery plan for listed species that typically
is written by the federal agencies prescribing local
actions. Realizing the opportunity to act on behalf
of the region — not just the wishes of the federal
government exclusively — a collaborative initiative was
undertaken to coordinate with existing recovery eff orts
in the area. Parties to the eff ort include tribal govern-
ments, state government, local governments, business
and conservation groups, and, perhaps most impor-
tant for this collaborative eff ort, NOAA Fisheries and
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Th e Shared Strategy is
the fi rst regional eff ort to develop a recovery plan not
written by federal agencies. From the bottom up, this
example of intergovernmental management appears to
be both opportunistic and collaborative.
Th ere can be no argument that national actions have
become more dominant since the time of the
Kestnbaum Commission, particularly in recent years.
As Conlan states, legislation such as the No Child Left
Behind Act is “intrusive and dismissive of state and
local concerns,” but it is important that any discussion
of managing within federalism include a view from
the bottom. As collaborative intergovernmental and
interorganizational networks develop in many policy
areas, the opportunities for assertive local and regional
action are both prominent and encouraging.
References
Agranoff , Robert . 2001 . Managing Within the
Matrix: Do Collaborative Intergovernmental
Relations Exist? Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism
31 ( 2 ): 31 – 56 .
— — — . 2003 . Leveraging Networks: A Guide for
Public Managers Working across Organizations .
Washington, DC : IBM Center for the Business of
Government .
Agranoff , Robert , and Michael McGuire . 2001 . American
Federalism and the Search for Models of Management .
Public Administration Review 61 ( 6 ): 671 – 81 .
— — — . 2003a . Inside the Matrix: Integrating the
Paradigms of Intergovernmental and Network
Management . International Journal of Public
Administration 26 ( 12 ): 1401 – 22 .
— — — . 2003b . Collaborative Public Management:
New Strategies for Local Governments . Washington,
DC : Georgetown University Press .
Beer , Samuel H . 1993 . To Make a Nation: Th e
Rediscovery of American Federalism . Cambridge,
MA : Belknap Press .
Derthick , Martha . 2000 . American Federalism: Half-
Full or Half-Empty? Brookings Review 18 ( 1 ): 24 – 27 .
Grodzins , Morton . 1960 . Th e Federal System . In
Goals for Americans: Th e Report of the President’s
Commission on National Goals , 265 – 82 . Englewood
Cliff s, NJ : Prentice Hall .
Hall , Th ad E ., and Laurence J O’Toole , Jr . 2000 .
Structures for Policy Implementation: An Analysis
of National Legislation, 1965 – 66 and 1993 – 94 .
Administration & Society 31 ( 6 ): 667 – 86 .
— — — . 2004 . Shaping Formal Networks through the
Regulatory Process . Administration & Society 36 ( 2 ):
186 – 207 .
Ingram , Helen . 1977 . Policy Implementation through
Bargaining: Th e Case of Federal Grants-in-Aid .
Public Policy 25 ( 4 ): 499 – 526 .
Kincaid , John . 1990 . From Cooperative to Coercive
Federalism . Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 509 : 139 – 52 .
Krueger , Skip , and Michael McGuire . 2005 . A
Transaction Costs Explanation of Interlocal
Government Collaboration . Paper presented at the
Eighth National Public Management Research
Conference , September 29 – October 1 , Los Angeles .
Moynihan , Donald P . 2005 . Leveraging Collaborative
Networks in Infrequent Emergency Situations .
Washington, DC : IBM Center for the Business of
Government .
Pressman , Jeff rey L . 1975 . Federal Programs and City
Politics: Th e Dynamics of the Aid Process in Oakland .
Berkeley : University of California Press .
Sanford , Terry . 1967 . Storm over the States . New York :
McGraw-Hill .
Schneider , Mark , John Scholz , Mark Lubell , Denisa
Mindruta , and Matthew Edwardsen . 2003 .
Building Consensual Institutions: Networks and
the National Estuary Program . American Journal of
Political Science 47 ( 1 ): 143 – 58 .
Stever , James A . 2005 . Adapting Intergovernmental
Management to the New Age of Terrorism .
Administration & Society 37 ( 4 ): 379 – 403 .
Th urmaier , Kurt , and Curtis Wood . 2002 . Interlocal
Agreements as Overlapping Social Networks:
Picket-Fence Regionalism in Metropolitan Kansas
City . Public Administration Review 62 ( 5 ): 585 – 98 .
Wildavsky , Aaron . 1984 . Federalism Means
Inequality: Political Geometry, Political Sociology,
and Political Culture . In Th e Costs of Federalism ,
edited by Robert T . Golembiewski and Aaron
Wildavsky , 55 – 59 . New Brunswick, NJ :
Transaction Books .
Wright , Deil S ., and Dale Krane . 1998 .
Intergovernmental Management (IGM) . In
International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and
Administration , edited by Jay M . Shafritz . Boulder,
CO : Westview .
Zimmerman , Joseph F . 1996 . Interstate Relations: Th e
Neglected Dimension of Federalism . Westport, CT :
Praeger .
15406210, 2006, 5, D
ow
nloaded from
https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com
/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00632.x by L
iberty U
niversity O
nline, W
iley O
nline L
ibrary on [20/07/2025]. See the T
erm
s and C
onditions (https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com
/term
s-and-conditions) on W
iley O
nline L
ibrary for rules of use; O
A
articles are governed by the applicable C
reative C
om
m
ons L
icense
**StateandLocalGovernmentIntergovernmentalRelationsPartII-1.pdf**
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**Kincaid-IntroductionSymposiumIntergovernmental-2011.pdf**
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**Agranoff-DeilWrightsOverlapping-2015.pdf**
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**Kincaid-BigQuestionsIntergovernmental-2011.pdf**
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